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Conceptualizing Collective
Bargaining under the Charter:
The Enduring Problem of
Substantive Equality
Judy Fudge*

Collective bargaining also enhances the Charter value of equality. One
of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate
the historical inequality between employers and employees.1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Health Services and
Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia2 was
both remarkable and unexpected; not only did the Court expressly
overrule 20 years of jurisprudence interpreting the freedom of
association as excluding collective bargaining,3 it did so in a case that
*
Professor and Lansdowne Chair in Law, University of Victoria. I would like to thank the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for funding the research upon which this article is
based.
1
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 84 [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”].
2
Id.
3
In the Labour Trilogy, which refers to three concurrently released appeals (Reference re
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Alberta Reference”], Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No.
9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.), and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
460 (S.C.C.)), a plurality of the Court held that s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.)
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”] did not include collective bargaining. The main reasons were
delivered in the Alberta Reference, a case involving compulsory arbitration to resolve impasses in
collective bargaining and a prohibition on strikes. Of the six justices participating in the case, three
held that collective bargaining was not protected by s. 2(d); four held that strike activity was not
protected. The next case to deal with the issue was Professional Institute of the Public Service of
Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PIPSC”], in which the Government of the Northwest Territories refused to
enact legislation required in order for the PIPSC (union) to bargain collectively on behalf of nurses.
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dealt with collective bargaining in the health-care sector, a politically
charged area in which the Court’s recent forays had been extremely
controversial.4 The case has garnered a great deal of attention from
constitutional pundits who predict dire consequences for both the health
care system and the “Canadian constitutional fabric”, labour lawyers and
academics who study labour law and workers’ rights.5 Even among
labour law academics sympathetic to providing constitutional protection
for workers’ rights, the Court’s reasoning has attracted a fair measure of
criticism.6 Moreover, the case has generated a great deal of speculation
regarding the scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of
association. In some (but not other) instances, provincial governments
have responded to the Court’s ruling by extending labour legislation to
include previously excluded groups of government and broader public
sector employees.7 It has also triggered a spurt of litigation that
A majority of four held that collective bargaining was not protected by s. 2(d). In 2001 in Dunmore
v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Dunmore”], the Court affirmed its position that freedom of association protected in the Charter did
not include collective bargaining.
4
The Supreme Court has evinced great concern for the fiscal health of Canada’s healthcare sector, which is essentially a single (government) payer system. In Chaoulli v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.), the Court opened the door
to the privatization of health care by permitting private health insurance in limited circumstances in
Quebec. In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland Assn. of Public Employees (NAPE),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Newfoundland v. NAPE”], the
Court accepted the Newfoundland government’s fiscal concerns as an acceptable justification to
cancel an agreed upon pay equity payment and thereby to violate women’s equality rights.
5
Pamela Fayerman, “Court ruling ‘bolsters’ private health care; Governments will now
find it harder to restructure system, legal expert says” Vancouver Sun, June 20, 2007, at B1, reported
that Patrick Monahan told a B.C. Government Health symposium that one of the unintended
consequences of the B.C. Health Services case is that it will result in a market for supplementary
private health insurance to pay for care in the private sector. According to Robert Charney, in “The
Contract Clause Comes to Canada: The British Columbia B.C. Health Services Case and the
Sanctity of Collective Agreements” (unpublished paper), the decision has the potential to result in “a
significant interference with government regulation, and to impose laissez-faire economic principles
on the Canadian constitutional fabric”. (Quoted in Jamie Cameron, “Due Process, Collective
Bargaining and Section 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on B.C. Health Services” (2008) 42
S.C.L.R. (2d) 131, at 142, fn. 45.)
6
See Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of
Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151 [hereinafter
“Tucker”], for a criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s use of history, and Brian Langille,
“Can We Rely on the ILO? (Don’t Ask the Supreme Court of Canada)” (2008) 13 C.L.E.L.J. 363,
who criticizes the decision for misunderstanding international labour law.
7
About 2,000 seasonal and casual workers in Nova Scotia will receive collective
bargaining rights under proposed legislation, “Seasonal workers to gain bargaining rights, benefit”
The Globe and Mail, December 1, 2007, at A13. The Chair of the Labour Relations Board, Kevin
Whitaker, was appointed by the Ontario government to study and to report on whether collective
bargaining rights should be extended to part-time college teachers. His February 2008 report, A
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challenges a raft of restrictive labour legislation as unconstitutional.8 A
recent decision by the Quebec Superior Court,9 which (like the B.C.
case) involved legislation that radically restructured labour relations and
collective bargaining in the health care sector, suggests that the B.C.
Health Services case will be stirring up a lot of constitutional rightsrelated dust unless the Supreme Court of Canada steps in to dampen the
lower courts’ enthusiasm for a robust interpretation of freedom of
association in the labour context.
In an earlier article, I addressed two broad questions: what gave rise
to the decision and what does it portend for the role of the courts in
labour relations in Canada.10 This article builds upon the earlier one;
Review of the College Collective Bargaining Act: Report of the Advisor to the Minister of Training,
Colleges and Universities, recommended that collective bargaining rights be extended to part-time
college teachers (at 52), noting that their exclusion from collective bargaining legislation was “most
likely” a violation of the Charter (at 35). The Ontario government has introduced legislation (Bill
90, Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008, 49th Sess., Second Reading, June 12, 2008)
extending collective bargaining rights to part-time college teachers (although this legislation would
repeal provisions that currently prohibit members of the bargaining unit that is on strike or lockout
from working during lawful collective action). However, no similar announcement has been made
with respect to extending labour legislation to agricultural workers, who since 1996 have been going
to court in order to challenge their exclusion from collective bargaining legislation in Ontario. See
Dunmore, supra, note 3, and Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 45, 79 O.R. (3d)
219 (Ont. S.C.J.), and related action [2008] O.J. No. 1219, 2008 ONCA 222 (Ont. C.A.).
8
British Columbia teachers’ unions are challenging legislation that restructured collective
bargaining in the education sector. Members of the RCMP are challenging their exclusion from
collective bargaining legislation in the federal sector. Four construction unions in Alberta are
challenging provisions in the Alberta Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1 that prohibit
unions and employers from resorting to strike and lockouts and substituting instead binding
arbitration to resolve disputes relating to the negotiation of collective agreements if 75 per cent of
the group of trade unions and registered employers’ organizations in the construction sector have
entered into collective agreements. Two national unions representing professional employees in the
federal public sector have launched legal challenges to provisions in the Public Service Labour
Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 that restricts their ability to negotiate staff, job classifications
and pension benefits.
9
Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Québec (Procureur général), [2007] J.Q. no
13421, 2007 QCCS 5513 (Que. C.S.) (November 30, 2007, Judge Claudine Roy). For an English
summary of this decision see Lancaster House Headlines, January 10, 2008. This decision contrasts
markedly with the decision by Farley J. in Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), supra, note 7.
Justice Farley took a wait-and-see approach to a challenge brought by the United Food and
Commercial Workers’ Union that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002,
c. 16, which was introduced by the government in response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Dunmore, supra, note 3, did not pass constitutional muster.
10
“The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively in Canada and
Beyond” (2008) 37(1) Indus. L.J. 25-48. In so doing, I examined the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
order to assess what it means for future constitutional challenges to limitations on collective
bargaining. Using the Supreme Court’s reliance on international labour law in its interpretation of s.
2(d) as my point of departure, I focused on two issues (whether the constitutional protection for
freedom of association includes either the right to strike or promotes forms of minority unionism
that fall outside the majority and exclusive unionism associated with the Wagner Act and its
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however, it is neither descriptive nor predictive. Instead my goal is
threefold. First, I will attempt to understand how the Supreme Court
conceptualizes the constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively.
The reason why I am concerned with this conceptual question is because
I am troubled by the Court’s brief, and dismissive, treatment of the
argument that the impugned legislation violated the affected health care
workers’ equality rights. My suspicion is that the Court has adopted a
purely formal or procedural approach to collective bargaining that
cannot address the problem of substantive inequality. Although this
approach may promote democratic deliberation by requiring governments
to consult with the unions representing government employees who will
be adversely effected by legislation that interferes with collective
agreements, my concern is that it is disconnected from a broader, deeper
and more secure normative base upon which to ground labour rights.
Second, I will attempt to show that the Supreme Court’s dismissive
treatment of the equality argument is not only inconsistent with its decision
in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland Assn. of Public
Employees (NAPE),11 it both reflects and promotes an idea of equality that is
directed at fighting stereotypes to the exclusion of fostering substantive
equality. Third, I want to suggest that constitutional litigation in the labour
context supports and reinforces partisan politics by promoting a form of
aggressive adversarialism that is antithetical to a principled approach to
developing labour policy for an economy for which the prevailing form of
industrial pluralism no longer fits.

II. CONCEPTUALIZING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
In the B.C. Health Services case, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that “the s. 2(d) guarantee of freedom of association [in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms] protects the capacity of members of
labour unions to engage in collective bargaining on workplace issues.”12
Taking Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) as their point of
departure, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., the authors of the judgment

Canadian counterparts) in order to explore the relationship between domestic constitutional law in
Canada and international norms in the labour context.
11
Supra, note 4.
12
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 2.
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with which five other members of the Court concurred,13 concluded “that
the grounds advanced in the earlier decisions for the exclusion of
collective bargaining from the Charter’s protection of freedom of
association do not withstand principled scrutiny and should be rejected”.14
This proposition along with three others — Canada’s historic
recognition of the importance of collective bargaining to freedom of
association, international law’s understanding of collective bargaining as
an integral component of freedom of association and the compatibility of
a right to collective bargaining with the promotion of other Charter
rights, freedoms, and values — were advanced by the majority for the
conclusion that section 2(d) of the Charter protects the process of
collective bargaining. Instead of examining all four propositions, I shall
focus on three aspects of the Court’s reasons: first, the shift from
conceptualizing freedom of association as an individual to a collective
right; second, the very limited positive obligation placed upon the state
to protect collective bargaining; and third, the procedural, as opposed to
substantive, nature of the obligation.
1. Overturning Precedent
In the most astonishing part of the B.C. Health Services decision,
McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. systematically subjected the five reasons
provided in the Labour Trilogy and the subsequent decision of
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest
Territories (Commissioner) (“PIPSC”) to critical analysis. They simply
dismissed the first reason, that the rights to strike and to bargain
collectively are “modern rights” created by legislation and not
“fundamental freedoms”, as “fail[ing] to recognize the history of labour
relations in Canada”,15 which they developed in their second proposition.
They also dispatched the second reason, judicial deference to labour
relations policy, as quickly as they did the first, claiming not only that it
ignores history, but that, in addition, it takes “an overbroad view of
judicial deference”.16 They asserted that the third reason, “freedom of
association protects only those activities performable by an individual”,
13
Justice Deschamps also agreed that freedom of association included collective
bargaining, but she both offered a different test for determining when that right had been violated
and provided a different s. 1 analysis of what constituted a lawful infringement of the right.
14
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 22.
15
Id., at para. 25.
16
Id., at para. 26.
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was overtaken by Dunmore, where the Court recognized that certain
collective activities have no individual analogue and yet are deserving of
protection.17 They also rejected the fourth reason, suggested by
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in PIPSC, that freedom of association was not
intended to protect the objects or goals of an association. The final and
overarching problem that McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. identified with
the majority judgments in the Labour Trilogy and PIPSC is their
adoption of a decontexutalized approach to defining the scope of
freedom of association, in contrast to the purposive approach taken to
other Charter guarantees.
The last three reasons offered by the Court for overturning precedent
most directly pertain to the aspects of the analysis of the right to bargain
collectively with which I am concerned, and with the exception of the
fourth reason, which hinges on the distinction between the process of
collective bargaining and its substantive outcomes, they are rooted in
Dunmore. According to McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., Dunmore
“clarified three developing aspects of the law: what constitutes
interference with the ‘associational aspect’ of an activity; the need for a
contextual approach to freedom of association; and the recognition that
s. 2(d) can impose positive obligations on government”.18
2. Freedom to Associate: The Shift from an Individual to a
Collective Right
One of the most controversial aspects of the B.C. Health Services
case is the Court’s conclusion that the “narrow focus on individual
activities” in the Labour Trilogy and in PIPSC “has been overtaken by
Dunmore, where this Court rejected the notion that freedom of
association applies only to activities capable of performance by
individuals”.19 In Dunmore, Bastarache J. held that “[t]o limit s. 2(d) to
activities that are performable by individuals would … render futile
these fundamental initiatives” since, as Dickson C.J.C. noted in his
dissent in the Alberta Reference, some collective activities may, by their
very nature, be incapable of being performed by an individual.20

17
18
19
20

Id., at paras. 27-28.
Id., at para. 31.
Dunmore, supra, note 3, at para. 28.
Id., at para. 16.

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONCEPTUALIZING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

219

It is not precisely clear what Bastarache J. meant by characterizing
collective bargaining as a collective, and not an individual, right. Part of
the problem is that he failed to distinguish between the question of who
possesses the right (the individual or the collective) and the question of
the conditions necessary for the right’s successful exercise.21 Collective
bargaining could be viewed as an individual right, in the sense that it
vests in the individual worker and not in the collective, which is the
trade union. But, even if it were to be considered an individual right,
collective bargaining would be one of a hybrid nature, since it is a right
that can only be enjoyed by individuals when it is exercised collectively.22
This characterization of the right to bargain collectively is compatible
with McIntyre J.’s approach in the Labour Trilogy, which was that
individuals should be entitled to do collectively what they are entitled to
do singly. Since individuals have the right singly to bargain their terms
and conditions of employment, they should be permitted to bargain them
collectively.23 In this conception of the right to bargain collectively the
individual possesses the right, but the right is collective to the extent that
it can only be exercised in concert with others. It recognizes both that
there is an individual analogue to collective bargaining (which is
individual bargaining) and that the right vests in the individual; however,
it also appreciates the qualitative difference between individual and
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, unlike individual bargaining,
is essentially an associational activity. This approach is also compatible
with Bastarache J.’s understanding of what Dickson C.J.C. meant in the
Alberta Reference; “such activities may be collective in nature, in that
they cannot be performed by individuals acting alone”.24
However, at other points in his analysis Bastarache J. appears to
conceive of the right to bargain collectively as a collective right in the
sense that the right is vested in the collective (the union), and not in
individual employees. In his dissenting judgment in the Alberta Reference,
Dickson C.J.C. stated:
There will, however, be occasions when no analogy involving individuals
can be found for associational activity, or when a comparison between
21
Sheldon Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labor Law and Political Theory
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), at 35 [hereinafter “Leader”].
22
Id., at 32.
23
Diane Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter” (2002) 40 (3&4)
Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at 381-83.
24
Dunmore, supra, note 3, at para. 16 (emphasis added), quoting Alberta Reference, supra,
note 3, at 367.
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groups and individuals fails to capture the essence of a possible
violation of associational rights.25

Taking this statement as his warrant, Bastarache J. went on to assert:
… the very notion of “association” recognizes the qualitative differences
between individuals and collectivities. It recognizes that the press
differs qualitatively from the journalist, the language community from
the language speaker, the union from the worker. In all cases, the
community assumes a life of its own and develops needs and priorities
that differ from those of its individual members. … [B]ecause trade
unions develop needs and priorities that are distinct from those of their
members individually, they cannot function if the law protects
exclusively what might be “the lawful activities of individuals”. 26

This conception of the right to bargain collectively is essentially
collective; the right vests in the collective and not in the individual.
However, the problem with this approach is that it begs the deeper
normative question concerning the needs and priorities of collectivities
such as trade unions that ought to be constitutionally protected.
Whether the right to bargain collectively is considered to be a
hybrid-individual right that can only by exercised collectively or a
purely collective right has important consequences.27 A right to bargain
collectively that vests in the individual would not depend upon the
existence of an acceptable or officially recognized trade union. Even if
the right were to vest in the individual, it would not necessarily follow
that when the individual’s right clashes with the collective that the
individual’s right would take precedence. How to resolve any conflict
between the individual and the collective would depend on the rights and
interests at stake and how they are exercised. However, if the right to
bargain collectively is seen as vesting in the collective as an institution
then the individual would not have the right to engage in collective
pursuits outside of what he or she engages in through that institution.
Moreover, vesting the right to bargain collectively in the collective
would require some prior notion of and justification for the “acceptable”
objects of unions. The problem with such an approach to the freedom to
25

Id., at para. 16, quoting Alberta Reference, id., at 367.
Id., at para. 17, quoted in B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 28.
27
As Leader demonstrates, these consequences are much more important when it comes to
the right to strike, and he illustrates these consequences by contrasting the case of France, where the
right to strike is an individual right that vests in the workers, with that of Germany, where the right
is a collective one that vests in the union: see supra, note 21, at 183-200.
26
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associate is that it precludes a range of alternative collectivities through
which individuals can operate.28 In effect, what it does is elevate the
tenets of a particular form of industrial pluralism, in which trade unions
have exclusive bargaining rights, to a constitutional right. As Sheldon
Leader notes, it is also inattentive to “the increasing cleavages of
fundamental interest among the workforce on some issues”.29
Although it is not clear in which way the freedom to associate and
the right to bargain collectively are considered to be collective rights (as
a hybrid-individual or purely collective right) in the B.C. Health Services
case, both the extracts that McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. quote from
Dunmore and their treatment of the history of collective bargaining in
Canada suggest that they regard it as purely collective. Eric Tucker has
demonstrated that the Court’s judgment rests upon and reinforces an
industrial pluralist account of the history of Canadian collective
bargaining law.30
A central problem with the Court’s historical analysis of collective
bargaining is that it elides the different legal statuses that the activity of
collective bargaining has had at different periods of time. Although
workers engaged in the activity of collective bargaining back in the early
1800s, until 1872 it was, at the very least, potentially criminal activity.
By the early 1900s, workers were free to bargain collectively in the
sense that the state did not prohibit the activity. But collective bargaining
only became a legal right in the mid-1940s when the state imposed a
legal duty on employers to bargain in good faith with a certified trade
union.31 Thus, while it is true that the social practice of collective
bargaining has long been recognized, it does not follow from this
observation that collective bargaining as a procedural right backed by the
duty to bargain in good faith has long been recognized. The Court has
attempted to construct a linear narrative of the history of Canadian
labour law in which the immanent right to bargain collectively was
realized during the Second World War with the advent of a Wagnerbased model of collective bargaining legislation.32 If the Canadian
variety of majority-based, exclusive union representation backed by an
28

Id., at 205.
Id., at 269. Two-tier wage schemes, in which employees with shorter service than those
with longer tenure receive less wages, and conflicts between workers who are parents of young
children and those who are not are examples of such cleavages.
30
Tucker, supra, note 6.
31
Id.
32
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 68.
29
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obligation imposed upon employers to bargain in good faith is taken as
the apotheosis of the right to bargain collectively then the right is a
collective right since the right vests in the duly certified or recognized
trade union and not in the individual worker.
3. The Limited Scope of the Positive Duty to Protect Collective
Bargaining
The fifth reason McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. offered for overturning
the narrow interpretation of the freedom to associate provided in the
Labour Trilogy and PIPSC is the need to adopt a contextual approach.
Once again they put great store in Dunmore, which recognized that
section 2(d) may place positive obligations on the government to extend
legislation to particular groups. However, they were also careful to
emphasize the limitations expressed in Dunmore on the scope of this
positive duty; “there must be evidence that the freedom would be next to
impossible to exercise without positively recognizing a right to access a
statutory regime”.33
The limited scope of the state’s obligation to provide protections for
collective bargaining has its roots in the Supreme Court’s commitment
to ensuring that the Charter only directly applies to governmental or
public action. While there is a great deal of indeterminacy about what
counts as public action in order to trigger the application of the Charter,
the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to maintain its position, first
articulated in Dolphin Delivery, that common law litigation between
private parties is outside the purview of the Charter.34 What this
restriction means in the employment context is that employers can use
their common law rights enforced by judge-made common law doctrines
to interfere with workers’ freedom to join unions and unions’ right to
bargain collectively without having to worry that the Charter will unduly
restrict them.35

33

Id., at para. 34.
R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.).
35
R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No.
7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the common law
restrictions on picketing in light of Charter values and disavowed the common law tort that rendered
secondary picketing per se illegal. However, as the Court noted, there is a plethora of torts that can
be used to limit the scope of picketing.
34
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4. The Right to Bargain Collectively as Purely Procedural
The fourth reason that McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. gave for
departing from precedent was their rejection of L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s
suggestion in PIPSC that freedom of association was not intended to
protect the objects or goals of an association. Instead, they developed a
distinction — between a procedure and its substantive outcome — that is
a crucial element in their positive definition of the right to bargain
collectively. In contradistinction to L’Heureux-Dubé J. they claimed that
it will always be possible to characterize the pursuit of a particular
activity in concert with others as the “object” of that association.
However, they acknowledged that her “underlying concern — that the
Charter not be used to protect the substantive outcomes of any and all
associations — is a valid one”.36 Invoking an early article by Bora
Laskin — the grandfather of Canadian labour law and a former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada — in support of their preferred
distinction, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. declared that “‘collective
bargaining’ as a procedure has always been distinguishable from its final
outcomes (e.g., the results of the bargaining process, which may be
reflected in a collective agreement)”.37 Thus, they concluded “it is entirely
possible to protect the ‘procedure’ known as collective bargaining without
mandating constitutional protection for the fruits of that bargaining
process.”38
5. Substantive Equality and the Right to Bargain Collectively
Having made the negative case for overturning precedent, McLachlin
C.J.C. and LeBel J. resort to history, international law and Charter
values to make the positive case that collective bargaining is protected
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. They identify
equality as one of the Charter values that the right to bargain collectively
promotes:
Collective bargaining also enhances the Charter value of equality. One
of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate

36
37
38

B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 29 (S.C.C.).
Id.
Id.
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the historical inequality between employers and employees: see
Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., per Iacobucci J.39

Moreover, it is clear that the Court is endorsing a substantive
conception of economic inequality, since McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J.
quote from Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference:
Freedom of association is the cornerstone of modern labour relations.
Historically, workers have combined to overcome the inherent
inequalities of bargaining power in the employment relationship and
to protect themselves from unfair, unsafe, or exploitative working
conditions.40

The goal of fostering substantive equality could function as the
normative basis for grounding a purely collective right to freely
associate that vests in trade unions. However, in order to do so, the Court
would need to provide a more detailed account of what constitutes
inequality of bargaining power and the extent to which that inequality
should be remedied. But instead of developing substantive equality as
the normative basis for the constitutionally protected right to bargain
collectively, the Court goes on to develop a very thin conception of the
right from which a substantive vision of equality is virtually absent.
6. A Thin Conception of the Right to Bargain Collectively
Having made the positive case for recognizing a right to bargain
collectively, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. proceed to explain what this
right entails. In light of the judgment’s expansive rhetoric extolling
collective bargaining as tantamount to a fundamental human right, what
is striking is just how limited the right is. First, the Charter only applies
to state action, that is, to legislation or to the government as an
employer. The Charter does not apply to private employers directly. To
succeed in arguing that under-inclusive legislation violates freedom of
association, a claimant would have to demonstrate “the freedom would
be next to impossible to exercise without positively recognizing a right
to access a statutory regime”.41 In Dunmore, the Supreme Court held that
the state had a positive duty to enact legislation to protect workers’
39
40

Id., at para. 84.
Id., quoting Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 334

(S.C.C.).
41

(S.C.C.).

Id., at para. 34 referring to Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016
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Charter rights if the party seeking the legislative protection could
establish an evidentiary foundation that without legislative protection the
workers would not be able to enjoy, form, join and participate in trade
unions.42 Nothing in Dunmore requires the state to provide collective
bargaining legislation where there is none.43 Second, section 2(d) does
not guarantee the particular objectives sought through associational
activity, only the process through which those goals are pursued. Third,
the Charter does not protect all aspects of the associational activity of
collective bargaining. It protects only against “substantial interference”
with associational activity. Invoking Dunmore as support, McLachlin
C.J.C. and LeBel J. assert “the state must not substantially interfere with
the ability of a union to exert meaningful influence over working
conditions through a process of collective bargaining conducted in
accordance with the duty to bargain in good faith”.44 Fourth, McLachlin
C.J.C. and LeBel J. were very careful to state that the right to collective
bargaining protected by section 2(d) of the Charter is a limited right;
“the right is to a general process of collective bargaining, not to a
particular model of labour relations, not to a specific bargaining
method”.45 The Court did not consider modifications to collective
bargaining legislation to violate section 2(d). Thus, despite the bold
statement at the beginning of judgment “that the s. 2(d) guarantee of
freedom of association protects the capacity of members of labour
unions to engage in collective bargaining on workplace issues”, the
actual “right to collective bargaining … is a limited right”.46
The scope of the constitutionally protected right to bargain
collectively hinges on what substantial interference with the process of
42
Justice Bastarache concluded that the repeal of legislation extending labour legislation to
agricultural workers was a signal to employers that they did not have to respect the workers’
fundamental rights.
43
Nevertheless, it may be difficult for the state to repeal collective bargaining legislation in
the private sector entirely without putting anything in its place since this action could be considered
a signal to employers to interfere with workers’ fundamental rights. At the very least, in the private
sector some restrictions on employers’ exercise of their civil rights (such as to discharge employees
for being union members) would seem to be warranted. In the public sector, since the employer is a
state actor, there may be a more robust duty to bargain, perhaps even with unions representing less
than a majority of workers. My thanks to Eric Tucker for the latter observation.
44
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 36, at para. 90.
45
Id., at para. 91.
46
Id., at paras. 2 and 91. Despite the Court’s care in delineating how restrictive the
constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively is, some commentators have asserted “it is
clear that the Court’s collective bargaining scheme will impose substantial burdens on public sector
employers”. Cameron, supra, note 5, citing Charney, supra, note 5.
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collective bargaining means. Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel J. went
on to elaborate that substantial interference is to be assessed on two
bases, both of which are essential: (1) the importance of the matter
affected to the process of collective bargaining, and (2) the manner in
which the measure impacts on the collective right to good faith
negotiation and consultation. The essential question relating to the first
basis is whether the subject matter of the particular instance of collective
bargaining is such that interfering with bargaining over it will affect the
ability of unions to pursue common goals effectively. While not
determinative of this inquiry, the majority asserted that the more
important the matter is to a union and its members, the more likely there
is substantial interference with a section 2(d) right.47
Once it is established that the government action impacts on a
subject matter important to collective bargaining, then the second basis
for determining substantial interference comes into play: does the state
action respect the duty to consult and negotiate in good faith? In
attempting to give this notoriously vague and indeterminate duty some
content, the majority refers to ILO principles concerning collective
bargaining, the Canada Labour Code and provincial labour relations
legislation, remarks made by Senator Walsh in the Senate Committee
hearings on the Wagner Act, academic commentators and Supreme
Court judgments.48 The result is a confusing mishmash, in which the
procedural aspect of the duty is emphasized, although a court’s right to
evaluate the substance of negotiations in determining whether the duty
of good faith had been met is reaffirmed. Further complicating matters,
the majority introduces factors more appropriate to the section 1
analysis, which addresses whether the infringement of the right is
justified, into the determination of whether section 2(d) has been
breached. According to McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of legislative provisions, such as
situations of exigency and urgency, may “affect the content and
modalities of the duty to bargain in good faith”.49 However, these are the
same factors that are considered in the determination of the justification
for the violation. In fact, in the very next paragraph, they state that
section 1 “may permit interference with the collective bargaining process
47
The examples the Court provided were laws or state actions that prevent meaningful
discussion or consultation about working conditions or that nullify significant negotiated terms in
existing collective agreements.
48
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 36, at paras. 97-107.
49
Id., at para. 107.
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on an exceptional and typically temporary basis, in situations, for
example, involving essential services, vital state administration, clear
deadlocks and national crisis”.50
Thus, the Court’s commitment to furthering substantive economic
equality through providing constitutional protection for the right to
bargain collectively is belied by its articulation of what the right actually
comprises. It is difficult to see how a purely procedural right to bargain
collectively that is backed by an obligation on an employer to bargain in
good faith can address substantive inequality in bargaining power unless
such a right is reinforced by a dispute resolution procedure such as the
right to strike. The extent of the gap between the Court’s rhetoric of
substantive equality and the reality of the legal holding that implements
it is, as we shall see in the following part, clearly manifest in McLachlin
C.J.C. and LeBel J.’s dismissive treatment of the unions’ equality
argument in the B.C. Health Services case.

III. EQUALITY AT WORK
1. The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to Equality under
the Charter51
Equality is a contested concept that involves competing social
values. It can be informed by the values of traditional liberalism, such as
individualism and freedom, and understood in a formal sense as
consistency in treatment, or it can be infused with the social democratic
values, such as solidarity and welfare, which are aligned with
substantive equality.52 The openness and generality of the language of
equality requires courts to identify and to elaborate the values that
equality serves.
In 1989 the Supreme Court of Canada issued its first decision
interpreting equality rights, Law Society of British Columbia v.
Andrews,53 which became the touchstone for substantive equality.
Writing for the majority, McIntyre J. adopted a comparative and
50

Id., at para. 108.
This section and the one that follows are based upon Judy Fudge, “Substantive Equality,
the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Limits to Redistribution” (2007) 23 (2) S.A.J.H.R. 235-53
[hereinafter “Fudge”].
52
Gavin Anderson, “Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism” (2004)
17 Can. J.L. & Jur. 31; Colleen Sheppard, “Inclusive Equality and New Forms of Social
Governance” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 45, at 57-63 [hereinafter “Sheppard”].
53
[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].
51
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substantive approach to the guarantee of equality in section 15 that was
directed to prohibiting discrimination. Although his decision was lauded
both for rejecting the similarly situated approach and for placing the
burden for justifying the legislative distinction on the party seeking to
uphold the legislation, his notion of discrimination lacked a substantive
focus on inequalities entrenched in social and historical practices, norms
and attitudes. Instead, he favoured an individualized and decontextualized
approach that focused on the distinction between individual merit and
capacities, on the one hand, and, on the other, irrelevant stereotypes.54
After Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada became deeply
divided on how to interpret substantive equality.55 The question was
what kind of legislative distinction was to count as discrimination. This
question is contentious, and courts have many choices that they must
make and justify when deciding cases involving the Charter’s equality
rights. In an article entitled “Equality: The Most Difficult Right”,
McLachlin C.J.C. described equality as a Tantalus promising “more than
it can deliver”.56 She warned, “absolute substantive equality is
impossible” because of “the diversity of our society and its foundation in
the competition of the marketplace”.57 Thus, the exercise is one of
drawing limits to substantive equality. According to her:
A market-based representative democracy necessarily tolerates a
certain degree of disparity, economic and otherwise. It is perhaps for
this reason that the Canadian equality experience, expressed in human
rights legislation as well as in the enumerated grounds of section 15,
focuses on particular sources of inequality that have historically proven
unjust and harmful to the affected individuals and to society as a
whole.58

The Court sees rectifying the situation of disadvantaged groups as the
central goal of equality rights in the Canadian Charter.

54
This analysis of Andrews, id., draws upon research that I am conducting with my
colleague Hester Lessard on the shifting meaning of equality in Canadian jurisprudence.
55
William Black & Lynn Smith, “The Equality Rights” (2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 315; Peter
Hogg, “What Is Equality? The Winding Course of Judicial Interpretation” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)
39 [hereinafter “Black & Smith”]; Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and
Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299 [hereinafter “Martin”].
56
Beverley McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17,
at 20. This article was written before Justice McLachlin became Chief Justice.
57
Id.
58
Id., at 20-21.
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But the more difficult question, according to McLachlin C.J.C., is
“whether, and if so, to what extent, [the ambit of the equality guarantee]
should apply outside its traditional discrimination-oriented focus”.59 This
difficulty arises because:
The Charter positively accords Canadians equal benefit of the law and
equal protection from the law’s burden. This can be argued to extend
the guarantee of equality to matters beyond the scope of traditional
anti-discrimination law, to equal provision of state benefits, even when
the group excluded is not the object of historic discrimination.60

The question here is whether the state’s “largesse has been appropriately
distributed”; but, as the Chief Justice acknowledged, the problem is that
the goal of equality in this context is less clear.61
In 1999 in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),62 a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada adopted an
approach to equality that focused on the goal of protecting human
dignity. Justice Iacobucci set out what has become the authoritative
approach to interpreting the equality rights in section 15. He identified
the purpose of section 15 as preventing
… the violation of human essential dignity and freedom through the
imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice,
and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition
at law as human beings or members of Canadian society, equally
capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. 63

He also confirmed that the Court would continue to take the comparative
approach to equality that it adopted in Andrews; “[u]ltimately, a court
must identify differential treatment as compared to one or more persons
or groups.”64
The equality framework set out in Law involves three stages and the
claimant has the burden at each stage. Only after the claimant has
satisfied all of the three stages does the government have the burden of
justifying the violation under section 1. The first inquiry focuses on the
law or the impugned state action in order to determine whether it draws a
distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of some
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id., at 24.
Id., at 25.
Id., at 26.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”].
Id.
Id., at para. 56.
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personal characteristics or fails to take account of a disadvantaged
position resulting in differential treatment. There are two components of
this stage — a distinction drawn by law and a difference in treatment
compared to another group. At this stage it is necessary to identify a
comparator in relation to which the claimant can properly claim unequal
treatment. In the second stage the target of the inquiry is how the
legislation is related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination or to a
ground that is analogous to a prohibited ground. The third stage is an
inquiry into the nature of the harm in order to determine whether there
has been discrimination in a substantive sense. The focus is on whether
the differential treatment harms or impairs the claimant’s dignity and
Iacobucci J. set out four contextual factors to assist in this stage. These
factors are: (1) the social disadvantage of the group represented by the
claimant; (2) the correspondence between legislative distinctions and
that actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant; (3) the
ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned legislation on a more
disadvantaged group; and (4) the nature of the claimant’s interest. The
first and fourth factors go to the harm suffered by the claimant — the
indignity, whereas the second and third factors save the legislation.65
The effect of this framework for evaluating equality claims has been
to restrict the redistributive impact of section 15. At the first stage a
claimant must establish differential treatment under the law66 and at the
second stage the claimant must establish that the differential treatment is
on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground.67
Identifying the appropriate comparator is necessary for identifying
differential treatment and the grounds of the distinction, and it is relevant
when considering many of the contextual factors in the discrimination
analysis. The question of the appropriate comparator is up to the Court to
decide, and it identifies the comparator on the basis of the subject matter
of the legislation and “biological, historical, and sociological similarities
or dissimilarities” between the claimant and others.68 Disputes about the

65

Hester Lessard, “Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality
Framework and Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)” (2004) 16 C.J.W.L. 165, at 17374.
66
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No.
71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.).
67
The Court has recognized sexual orientation, marital status and citizenship as analogous
grounds: see Black & Smith, supra, note 55, at 397-414.
68
Law, supra, note 62, at paras. 56-58, 90; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, at paras. 47, 52, 64 (S.C.C.); Auton,
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relevant pool for comparison reveal disagreements about whether
equality requires merely equal treatment or whether it aspires to a greater
ambition to achieve a more equal distribution.69
Moreover, the effect of interpreting equality through the lens of
dignity has been to focus on discrimination and to narrow the ambit of
substantive equality. So far the Court’s approach to dignity has tended to
emphasize self-worth and integrity and to downplay material and systemic
factors in determining whether equality rights have been violated.70 It has
viewed equality claims through an identity-based recognition framework
that displaces redistributive claims.71 The Court has also adopted a
“reasonable person standard” for the determination of whether the
distinction that disadvantages the claimant as compared to another group
violates the claimant’s dignity.72
Thus, while it is true that substantive equality entails a departure from
the treatment of equality rights as negative rights and its remedies can
include the extension both of benefits and legal protections,73 the
supra, note 66; Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No.
60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.).
69
Catherine Barnard & Bob Hepple, “Substantive Equality” (2000) 59 Cambridge L.J. 562.
70
Gwen Brodsky, “Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General): Autonomy with a Vengeance”
(2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 194, at 212; Sheppard, supra, note 52, at 50; Martin, supra, note 55, at 329.
71
It is not inevitable that recognition displaces redistribution since recognition can be seen
in terms of status subordination and not only identity misrecognition; see Judy Fudge, “The
Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the Imperialism of the Courts” in Tom
Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds., Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), at 335.
72
In Law, supra, note 62, at para. 61, the Court specified that a subjective-objective
standard should be used in assessing an injury to dignity. However, the Court has subsequently
moved to an objective or reasonable person standard. See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36,
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.). Recently, in R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41 (S.C.C.),
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the legitimacy of the criticisms of the use of dignity both
in and after Law and reaffirmed the two-step approach to equality set out in Andrews, supra, note 53.
73
Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) addressed the
issue of the appropriate remedy for discriminatory benefits. In Eldridge v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) the Court ordered the
government of British Columbia to provide interpreter services for deaf patients who were using
hospital services. In Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.) the Court
ordered the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Alberta’s
anti-discrimination legislation. In Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003]
S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) the Court held that the denial of benefits to sufferers of
chronic pain was discriminatory and ordered that benefits be provided to them. However, in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) a unanimous
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a new approach to remedies for the violation of Charter
protected-equality rights, denying the surviving same-sex spouses fully retroactive pension benefits.
The Supreme Court’s restrictive approach to remedies for breaches of equality rights is discussed in
Cristin Schmitz, “Top court’s restriction of Charter remedies seen as a major shift” The Lawyers
Weekly, March 16, 2007, vol. 25, number 42, at 24.
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redistributive potential of equality rights is quite small.74 It is important to
remember that the majority of equality claims have been unsuccessful.75 In
cases involving equality rights claims that directly target the ways in
which governments raise and distribute material resources in areas such as
income tax, pension, or social assistance policy it is rare that the claimant
is able to establish discrimination.76
2. Newfoundland v. NAPE: “More than just a matter of dollars
and cents”77
In light of the fact that redistributive claims are rarely successful
under section 15, Newfoundland v. NAPE was an unusual case.78 It was
the first equality case brought by women in which the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Charter’s equality guarantees had been violated.79
But it was also the first equality case in which the Court justified the
violation of equality rights solely on economic grounds.
In 1988 the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador signed a
pay equity agreement with five of its public sector trade unions that was
designed to equalize the wages of women and men who performed work
of the same value.80 Three years later when the government and the
74
Margot Young, “Change at the Margins: Eldridge v. British Columbia and Vriend v.
Alberta” (1998) 10 C.J.W.L. 244.
75
Sheila McIntyre, “The Supreme Court and Section 15: A Thin and Impoverished Notion
of Judicial Review” (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 731, at 742-45. McIntyre looked at the results of the
equality cases since Law.
76
Bruce Ryder, Cecilia Faria & Emily Lawrence, “What’s Law Good For?: An Empirical
Overview of Charter Equality Decisions” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103, at 126.
77
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at para. 40 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J. He quoted
the now notorious dissent of Dickson C.J.C. in the Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 313, at 368 (S.C.C.) that “[w]ork is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life.”
78
However, from the perspective of wage control legislation, Newfoundland v. NAPE is
typical. The Supreme Court of Canada had previously decided that legislation revoking collective
bargaining rights and ignoring collective agreements as a response to a financial emergency was
constitutional: see Reference re Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R.
373 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
424 (S.C.C.).
79
Patricia Hughes, “Case Comment: Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.” (2004)
11 C.L.E.L.J. 16, n. 47. It is also one of the two equality cases after Law in which the Court used
s. 1 to uphold legislation that violated equality. The other case was Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J.
No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (S.C.C.), in which the federal civil service hiring preference in favour
of Canadian citizens was held to be discriminatory but justified.
80
Pay equity is the term used in Canada for equal pay for work of equal value strategies.
The purpose of pay equity is to redress the historical undervaluation of work that has traditionally
been performed by women.
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unions finally agreed upon the wage adjustments necessary to achieve
pay equity, the government claimed that it was in a financial crisis. As
part of a series of measures to deal with the provincial deficit, the
government enacted public sector wage restraint legislation that
cancelled the $24 million in pay equity wage adjustments that it owed to
the women employed in the province’s health care sector.
The Newfoundland Association of Public Employees (“NAPE”),
which represented the predominantly female health care workers, managed
to navigate successfully through the maze of equality jurisprudence;
however, it was stymied at the section 1 stage. In 2004, a unanimous
seven-member bench of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the
legislation cancelling the pay equity debt on the ground that the
province’s financial crisis justified violating the (predominantly women)
workers’ equality rights.
Justice Binnie began his equality analysis by noting “[t]he value
placed on a person’s work is more than just a matter of dollars and
cents”.81 Starting from this premise, he concluded that this case “fits
easily within the framework established in Law v. Canada … which
identified the affirmation of human dignity and self-worth as a central
purpose of s. 15(1) of the Charter”.82 He found that the wage control
legislation drew a formal distinction between those who were entitled to
benefit from pay equity and everyone else; that the appropriate
comparator group consisted of men in male-dominated classifications
performing work of equal value; and that the differential treatment arose
not merely because of the type of job, but rather because the job is one
generally held by women. Having concluded that the first two steps of
the Law analysis were fulfilled — a distinction resulting in a disadvantage
in relation to a comparator group and a prohibited ground (in this case
sex) — he moved on to consider whether the distinction amounted to
discrimination in light of the four contextual factors set out in Law.
The analysis of the first three factors was straightforward. What is
interesting is Binnie J.’s treatment of the fourth factor — the nature of
the claimant’s interest. The fact that the women workers were paid less
than what their work was worth and that this low pay would translate
into lower pensions was not of sufficient importance to merit
constitutional protection. What was needed was some infringement of
the women workers’ dignity. According to him, “[l]ow pay often denotes
81
82

Newfoundland v. NAPE, supra, note 77, at para. 40.
Id., at para. 41.
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low status jobs, exacting a price in dignity as well as dollars”.83 Thus he
concluded that the wage restraint legislation violated the women
workers’ equality rights, and in doing so he transformed a distributive
claim into one involving dignity.
However, despite his ringing endorsement of equality rights and
the declaration that the Court must act as the referee who determines the
boundaries of the legal exercise of state power, Binnie J. found that
the provincial legislation was a demonstrably justified limitation of the
women workers’ equality rights. His section 1 analysis demonstrates
how easy it is for a government to override equality rights in the name of
fiscal crisis. All the government has to do is declare a fiscal crisis in the
legislature and the courts will take judicial notice of the emergency and
defer to the government’s judgment in balancing women’s equality
rights against competing social values.84
3. Equality in the B.C. Health Services Case: Nothing Personal
In the B.C. Health Services case, the unions’ equality challenge
emphasized the fact that employment in the health services sector is
female dominated and that women’s work has historically been
undervalued in order to engage the right to equality protected in section
15. Here the main hurdle was the Law test. The specific difficulty facing
the health services unions was to persuade the various levels of courts
that the gendered nature of health service occupations could function as
a personal characteristic that could ground a claim of discrimination.
With the exception of L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s separate concurring reasons
in Dunmore and an offhand remark by the majority in Delisle — two
cases that dealt with freedom of association and collective bargaining for
workers who were excluded from statutory schemes — there is no
authority for the proposition that occupational status may be recognized
as an analogous ground.85
The health care unions urged the British Columbia Supreme Court to
adopt a remedial and purposive approach to section 15, which assessed
section 15 claims on a “contextual, flexible basis from the perspective of
83

Id., at para. 49.
See the discussion in Fudge, supra, note 51, at 248-51.
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Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at para. 167 (S.C.C.); Delisle v.
Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 44 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Delisle”].
84
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the claimant”.86 As part of the “contextual matrix” the unions emphasized
the disadvantage women suffer in employment, the prejudice and
stereotyping attached to “women’s work”, and the importance of
unionization and collective bargaining in overcoming this disadvantage.87
With respect to the first step of the Law test, the plaintiff unions and
health-care workers argued that occupational status is a personal
characteristic central to one’s identity and sense of self and that by
targeting health care workers Bill 29 failed to take account of the
plaintiffs’ already disadvantaged status, which resulted in substantially
different treatment between the plaintiffs and others on the basis of sex
and working in a female-dominated occupational sector. They also
identified the appropriate comparator group, which is the second element
of the first step, as public sector workers who do not work in the most
female-dominated sectors.88 Regarding the second step of the Law
equality framework, the plaintiffs argued that the health care workers
were disadvantaged on the basis of their sex, an enumerated ground, and
the analogous ground of women’s jobs since only health care workers
were targeted by the legislation, and that such workers are predominantly
female.89 They also argued that the third step of the Law test was fulfilled
since Bill 29 denied the benefit of collective bargaining only to health
care workers and that this drew a distinction on the basis of a personal
characteristic and perpetuated the view that these workers are not as
deserving of respect and consideration as other unionized workers.90
To begin her analysis of the health care workers and unions’ equality
claim, Garson J. set out the three broad inquiries of the Law framework,
and emphasized the need to adopt a purposive and contextual approach.
She also stressed the comparative aspect of the equality analysis, and
insisted that it was up to the court to determine the appropriate comparator.
Although Garson J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court accepted
both the unions’ evidence that the majority of workers affected by Bill
29 were women and were disproportionately members of visible minority
groups and the undisputed evidence given by the plaintiff’s expert Pat
Armstrong that women’s work is subject to systemic discrimination and

86
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2003] B.C.J. No. 2107, 19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 37, at para. 152 (B.C.S.C.).
87
Id.
88
Id., at para. 153.
89
Id., at para. 154.
90
Id., at para. 155.
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undervaluation,91 it was clear that she was not amenable to the section 15
claim. The key problem was that she did “not see how Bill 29 draws a
distinction between the plaintiffs and the comparator group on the basis
of personal characteristics”.92 According to her, the relevant comparator
group was unionized public sector workers outside of the health care
sector.93 She concluded that the distinction being drawn in Bill 29 “is
simply between different sectors within the broader public sector; it is
not based upon the personal characteristics of the employees within
these sectors”.94 Moreover, she went on to declare:
I do not consider the status of the plaintiffs as health care workers to be
a personal characteristic. This is particularly so given the broad and
disparate occupational classification that health care workers encompass
and because one’s personal choice [of occupation] is not an immutable
characteristic.95

Thus, the unions’ claim failed both aspects of the first step of the Law
test.
There are at least two problems with Garson J.’s analysis of the first
stage of the Law framework. The first is her failure to appreciate the
extent to which labour markets use ascribed characteristics, such as sex,
race and ethnicity, to allocate individuals to specific types of jobs. Labour
market analysts, especially those who study labour market segmentation
(how labour markets are composed of non-competing sectors with
profoundly different terms and conditions of employment and job
ladders) have demonstrated how personal characteristics such as sex and
race are used as markers by firms to allocate employment opportunities
and to justify difference in employment terms.96 Since specific kinds of
91
Id., at para. 161. In 2003, 85 per cent of Hospital Employees Union (“HEU”) members
were women, 90 per cent of British Columbia Government Employees Union (“BCGEU”) members
in the community sector were women, and 27 per cent of HEU members self-identified as visible
minorities compared with 18 per cent of British Columbians as a whole.
92
Id., at para. 164 (emphasis in original).
93
She also had difficulty with the unions’ choice of comparator group as public sector
workers who do not work in the most female dominated sectors because, according to her, it is a
comparator group that has the basis of the s. 15 claim infused into its description. Id., at para. 164.
94
Id., at para. 173.
95
Id.
96
For two classic texts, see C. Craig et al., Labour Market Structure, Industrial
Organization and Low Pay. Department of Applied Economics Occasional Paper 54 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Frank Wilkinson, ed., The Dynamics of Labor Market
Segmentation (New York, Academic Press, 1981). For a discussion of labour market segmentation
theories in a Canadian context see Gillian Creese, Contracting Masculinity: Gender, Class, and
Race in a White-Collar Union, 1944-1994 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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jobs are readily available to specific types of workers, such workers tend
to “choose” these jobs. However, this choice is shaped by broader
institutional factors, institutional factors that are, in turn, the residue of a
legacy of historical discrimination.
The second, and more troubling, problem is that Garson J. has
simply failed to appreciate the extent to which facially neutral distinctions
have an adverse impact on individuals on the basis of personal
characteristics. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized adverse
impact discrimination in 1985 in O’Malley.97 Moreover, in Meiorin the
Supreme Court recognized that adverse impact analysis was not
necessarily confined to minority groups; in that case the Court accepted
that a physical fitness standard designed for men had a discriminatory
impact on women, despite the fact that some women met the test, and
some men did not.98 While it is true that the Supreme Court adopted the
concept of adverse-effect discrimination in the context of interpreting
human rights legislation, and not the equality rights in the Charter, it is
unclear why this concept is inapposite to establishing the first step in the
Law approach to discrimination.99 The British Columbia government

97
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 74,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.).
98
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999]
S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
99
The concurring decision of Abella J. in McGill University Health Centre (Montreal
General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de L’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.), suggests that some members of the Supreme Court of Canada want to
raise the threshold for establishing discrimination in the context of human rights legislation. Justice
Abella (with McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache J. concurring) rejected the majority’s conclusion that
the case turned on the question of accommodation. Rather, she declared that the pivotal issue was
whether the grievor had established prima facie discrimination, shifting the onus to the employer to
justify its workplace standard or conduct. In effect, she imposed an additional step on complainants
in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. According to her, “[n]ot every distinction
is discriminatory. It is not enough to impugn an employer’s conduct on the basis that what was done
had a negative impact on an individual in a protected group … It is the link between that group
membership and the arbitrariness of the disadvantaging criterion or conduct, either on its face or in
its impact, that triggers the possibility of a remedy. And it is the claimant who bears this threshold
burden” (at para. 49).What is particularly troubling about Abella J.’s decision is the extent to which
her proposal resonates with the restrictive format for establishing an infringement of the equality
rights guaranteed in the Charter set out in Law v. Canada. The current burden in human rights law
(which is to establish a prima facie case of discrimination) ensures that the party who is designing
and implementing workplace norms has the duty to ensure that these norms are as inclusive as
possible in light of the norms’ purpose and available resources. It is not clear why, as a matter of
principle or policy, this burden is too high. For a discussion of the case see Judy Fudge & John
Kilcoyn, “McGill University Health Centre v. Syndicat des employés de L’Hôpital général de
Montréal”, The Court, February 12, 2007, online at: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/02/12/mcgilluniversity-health-centre-v-syndicat-des-employe-de-l’hopital-general-de-montreal/> and Kathryn Meehan,
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may not have selected health care workers for special, and very
detrimental, treatment because the overwhelming majority of such
workers were women, but nonetheless the impact of selecting health care
workers was disproportionately to disadvantage women workers — a
group which can be identified on the basis of a shared personal
characteristic.
Despite her conclusion that the plaintiff’s equality argument failed to
meet the requirements of the first stage of the Law analysis, Garson J.
went through the remaining two steps. She considered the second step: Is
the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more
enumerated and analogous grounds? Here she specifically considered the
dicta in Dunmore and Delisle that occupational status could be an
analogous ground,100 and asked whether health care workers were more
like agricultural workers (as was the case in Dunmore) or police officers
(as was the case in Delisle). She concluded “they cannot be described in
the same way as the agricultural workers in Dunmore. I do not think for
the purposes of a s. 15 analysis the occupational group ‘health care
workers’ or ‘unionized health care workers’ can be seen as sharing the
same immutable characteristics”.101 According to her, the unique
circumstances surrounding health care work is the distinguishing factor,
and correspondence with sex or women’s work is not the basis of the
legislation. Thus, she concluded that the second step of the Law test had
not been made out.
Once again the problem with Garson J.’s analysis is that she ignores
the adverse impact that legislation targeting unionized health care
workers has upon women workers, a group that has been historically
discriminated against.102 It appears that she has imported the requirement
that the government “intend” to target health care workers because they
are women into her analysis of the second step in the Law framework. A
tacit requirement of intentional discrimination is the only way to
understand the following assertion:
The true effect of the law is not upon “women” or “those who perform
women’s work” it is upon those who perform health care work in
British Columbia’s unionized public sector. The unique circumstances
“McGill University Health Centre: Some Clarification on Discrimination and the Duty to
Accommodate” (2008) 13 C.J.L.E.L. 419.
100
She also noted that in both cases it was L’Heureux-Dubé J. writing alone who addressed
this question: B.C. Health Services, supra, note 86, at para. 178 (B.C.S.C.).
101
Id., at para. 180.
102
Id., at para. 162, the undisputed evidence of Pat Armstrong.
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surrounding that work is the distinguishing factor: correspondence with
sex or “women’s work” is not the basis of the legislation. 103

Given that Garson J. accepted the evidence that the overwhelming
majority of workers who would be affected by Bill 29 are women, it is
indisputable that a “true effect” of the law is upon women workers.
Moreover, it is not clear what she meant by the “unique circumstances
surrounding that work”, unless she is referring to the fact that the work
was covered by a collective agreement that the government no longer
wanted to honour.
In considering the third step, does the differential treatment
discriminate, Garson J. focused on dignity. She concluded: “[w]hile the
plaintiffs are clearly aggrieved by the legislation for various justifiable
reasons, the impact upon them is not of the quality or characteristic that
impacts their dignity in the sense that it engages s. 15”.104 She did not
offer any argument in support of this conclusion; instead she simply
recited a list of cases in which the Supreme Court and various appeal
courts had decided that a distinction based on a personal characteristic
did not impair the dignity of the individuals who shared the characteristic.105
The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld each element of the
trial judge’s section 15 analysis. Moreover, speaking for a unanimous
bench, Thackery J. went on to elaborate that the appellants’ submission:
… was more of a political assault than a legal argument. Its emotional
base does not contain any reference to evidence or to legal principles
that ground an argument based upon the test in Law. There can be no
doubt but that the appellants, whether they be the associations of
individuals or the individuals themselves, are angry. They were given,
by one government, rights that were used to improve union power and
individual incomes. Another government took away some of that
power and some of the economic benefits.106

Despite the fact that it was not necessary for the Supreme Court of
Canada to address the section 15 claim, since the appellant unions were
successful under section 2(d), the Court provided a cursory and
103

Id., at para. 181.
Id., at para. 189. It is not clear the extent to which R. v. Kapp, supra, note 72, will change
this emphasis upon dignity. However, it is clear that the Court was concerned that dignity had
become an additional element for a claimant to prove rather than a principle informing the Court’s
approach to equality.
105
Id., at para. 188.
106
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2004] B.C.J. No. 1354, 243 D.L.R. (4th) 175, at paras. 136 and 137 (B.C.C.A).
104

240

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

disappointing discussion of the equality argument.107 The Supreme Court
signalled its refusal to consider seriously the equality claim when it
refused LEAF’s motion to intervene.108 The majority dismissed the
appellant unions’ section 15 claim in six paragraphs. Despite the pain
inflicted by Bill 29 on health care workers, the Court refused to depart
from the view of the trial court judge that the effects of the legislation
did not constitute discrimination under section 15.109 The Court concluded:
… the distinctions made by the Act relate essentially to segregating
different sectors of employment, in accordance with the long-standing
practice in labour regulation of creating legislation specific to particular
segments of the labour force, and do not amount to discrimination
under s. 15 of the Charter. The differential and adverse effects of the
legislation on some groups of workers relate essentially to the type of
work they do, and not to the persons they are. Nor does the evidence
disclose that the Act reflects the stereotypical application of group or
personal characteristics. Without minimizing the importance of the
distinctions made by the Act to the lives and work of affected health
care employees, the differential treatment based on personal characteristics
required to get a discrimination analysis off the ground is absent here.110

The Court’s focus on combating stereotypes as the rationale for
providing constitutional protection for equality rights enabled it to sever
its analysis of the equality claim from its analysis of the freedom to
107

In Dunmore, supra, note 85, at para. 90 the majority of Court refused to address the s. 15
claim after the appellants were successful with the s. 2(d) argument.
108
Melina Buckley & Fiona Sampson, “LEAF and the Supreme Court of Canada Appeal of
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia” (2005) 17
C.J.W.L. 473.
109
Thousands of workers in the health services sector lost their jobs and accrued seniority,
and suffered substantial wage cuts, ranging from 15 to 40 per cent: see Marjorie Griffin Cohen &
Marcy Cohen, A Return to Wage Discrimination: Pay Equity Losses through the Privatization
(Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Vancouver, B.C.: April 2004) online at:
<http://policyalternatives.ca/documents/BC_Office_Pubs/bc_pay_equity.pdf> [hereinafter “Griffin
Cohen & Cohen”]; David Canfield, “Neo-liberalism and Working-Class Resistance in British
Columbia: The Hospital Employees’ Union Struggle, 2002-2004” (2006) 57 Labour/Le Travail 941.
110
B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 165 (S.C.C.). I
am sympathetic to Brian Langille’s claim in “Can We Rely on the ILO? (Don’t Ask the Supreme
Court of Canada)” (2008) C.L.E.L.J. 363, at 389-90 that s. 15 might provide an alternative (and,
perhaps, more suitable) basis for addressing some claims relating to constitutional labour rights.
However, my reading of the Supreme Court’s current approach to equality rights indicates that his
solution to the conundrum of s. 2(d) is extremely unlikely. Even under R. v. Kapp, supra, note 72, it
is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Canada would consider the legislation to be discriminatory
since the emphasis on stereotypes is a central element of the concept of discrimination at play in
Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
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associate despite the fact that it had earlier justified the latter as
including a right to bargain collectively because it promotes the Charter
value of substantive economic equality. Moreover, the Court’s analysis
ignored the extent to which labour legislation reflects and reinforces
historical patterns of labour market discrimination and segregation.111
The “long standing practice in labour regulation of creating legislation
specific to particular segments in the labour force” may be neutral on its
face but it has profoundly disparate and disadvantageous impacts upon
workers. The historical exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers
from private sector labour relations legislation is simply one contemporary
example.112 The majority’s assertion that “the differential and adverse
effects” of the impugned legislation on some groups of workers “relate
essentially to the type of work they do, and not to the type of persons
they are” demonstrates a cavalier disregard of statements made earlier in
the judgment that emphasize the significance of work to an individual’s
sense of identity, self-worth and dignity.113 And the claim that the
“evidence does not disclose that the Act reflects the stereotypical
application of group or personal characteristics” evinces a complete lack
of awareness of the extent to which ascribed characteristics such as sex
are used to channel individuals into given occupations. This lack of
awareness is surprising given that Abella J. was part of the majority, and
in 1984 she had released a report called Equality in Employment that
documented the degree of occupational discrimination experienced by
women.114 Most remarkably, the Court appears to have forgotten Binnie
J.’s remark in Newfoundland v. NAPE, made only three years earlier,

111
Judy Fudge, “Rungs on the Labour Law Ladder: Using Gender to Challenge Hierarchy”
(1997) 60(2) Sask. L. Rev. 237-63; Judy Fudge & Leah Vosko, “Gender, Segmentation and the
Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law and Policy” (2001) 22 Economic and
Industrial Democracy 271-310; Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, “Pluralism or Fragmentation?: The
Twentieth Century Employment Law Regime in Canada” (2000) 46 Labour/Le Travail 251-306;
Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action
in Canada, 1900 to 1948 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001).
112
Judy Fudge, “Little Victories and Big Defeats: The Rise and Fall of Collective
Bargaining Rights for Domestic Workers in Ontario” in Abigail Bakan & Daiva Stasiulis, eds.,
Making the Match: Domestic Placement Agencies and the Racialization of Women’s Household
Work (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), at 119-45; Judy Fudge, Affidavit: Between
Michael Fraser on his own behalf and on behalf of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union
Canada, Xin Yuan Liu, Julia McGorman and Billie-Jo Church v. Attorney General of Ontario.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, February 2004.
113
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 110, at para. 165.
114
Report of the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (Abella Report) (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1984).
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that “[t]he value placed on a person’s work is more than just a matter of
dollars and cents”.115
It would be unfair to fault Garson J. for failing to refer to
Newfoundland v. NAPE in 2003, since the Supreme Court of Canada
released its judgment in 2004, a year after her decision. Newfoundland v.
NAPE should have strengthened the B.C. health care unions’ equality
argument before the Supreme Court. As we saw, Binnie J. had no
difficulty in concluding that the Newfoundland and Labrador wage
control legislation violated the health care workers’ equality rights.
Although the B.C. legislation did not directly discriminate by
specifically targeting women’s work, as did the Newfoundland wagecontrol legislation, the impact of the B.C. legislation was indirectly to
disadvantage a group of workers the overwhelming majority of whom
were women. The fact that the Supreme Court did not refer to the 2004
case in its equality analysis of the B.C. Health Services case, especially
given that the majority referred to the earlier case in its analysis of
whether the infringement of the freedom to associate by the B.C.
legislation was justified, is inexplicable.116 Moreover, given the pay
equity subtext of the B.C. Health Services case, which I shall explain,
the failure of the Supreme Court to address seriously the equality
argument is inexcusable.117
In British Columbia there is no pay equity legislation that imposes
an obligation on either public or private sector employers to remedy the
widely recognized wage gap between female dominated and male
dominated jobs. Unions, such as the Hospital Employees Union, which
represents 90 per cent of health care workers in British Columbia,
embarked on an aggressive strategy of closing what was recognized to
be a gender-based wage gap between jobs filled predominantly by
women and jobs filled predominantly by men. This strategy involved
human rights complaints, negotiations backed by strikes and grievances.
In 1995 the British Columbia government, which was led by the New
Democratic Party, introduced the Public Sector Employers’ Council Pay
115
Newfoundland v. NAPE, [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
He quoted the now notorious dissent of Dickson C.J.C. in the Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No.
10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 368 (S.C.C.), that “[w]ork is one of the most fundamental aspects in a
person’s life.” The Supreme Court’s equality analysis in Newfoundland v. NAPE was brought to the
Court’s attention by the appellants in their factum, the Health Services and Support-Facilities
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. B.C., Court File No. 30554, at paras. 137, 165.
116
B.C. Health Services, supra, note 110, at paras. 145 and 147.
117
The pay equity context of the case was brought to the Court’s attention by the appellants
in their factum, supra, note 115, at para. 127.
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Equity Framework, which imposed an obligation on public sector
employers such as hospitals to develop pay equity plans, to file these
plans with the government, and to put aside 1 per cent of pay roll each
year in order to close the gender-based wage gap. The same year, the
Fraser Institute released a report claiming that the high wages for nonclinical health care workers was causing a crisis in the Canadian health
care system. By 2001, health care workers in British Columbia enjoyed
the highest wage rates and the lowest wage gap between men and
women of any jurisdiction in Canada.118
When the Liberal Party was elected to form the British Columbia
government in 2001, pay equity adjustments for the public sector were
scheduled for 2002 and 2003. Instead of revoking the Public Sector
Employers’ Council Pay Equity Framework, the government repealed
the amendment to the Human Rights Act, which had been enacted by the
N.D.P. government in its dying days, that imposed pay equity obligations
on private sector employers.119 At the same time, it appointed a Task
Force, led by a single commissioner (who later represented the
government in its defence of the Charter challenge brought by health
care unions against Bill 29) to recommend whether or not pay equity
legislation for the private sector was required. In her report, Nitya Iyer
recommended against introducing pay equity legislation for the private
sector, although she acknowledged the existence of a gender-based wage
gap, part of which could only be explained by the history of discrimination
against women in employment.120 Thus, one effect of Bill 29, which
resulted in the privatization of many non-clinical health care worker
jobs, was not only to relieve the government of having to pay higher
wages to health care workers in female-dominated jobs, but to permit the
private firms that were contracted to provide services to revert to paying
discriminatory wages with little risk that their practices would be
challenged.121

118
Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Marcy Cohen, “Privatization: A Strategy for Eliminating Pay
Equity in Health Care” in Kate Bezanson & Meg Luxton, eds., Social Reproduction: Feminist
Political Economy Challenges Neoliberalism (Kingston and Montreal: McGill Queens Press, 2006);
Griffin Cohen & Cohen, supra, note 109.
119
Id.
120
Nitya Iyer, Working Through the Wage Gap: Report of the Task Force on Pay Equity
(Victoria: February 28, 2002).
121
Griffin Cohen & Cohen, supra, notes 109 and 118.
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IV. PUTTING CHARTER RIGHTS TO WORK:
THE REALPOLITIK OF LITIGATION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s conception of the Charter’s
guarantee of the freedom to associate and equality is both shaped and
reinforced by the practicalities of constitutional litigation. It takes a great
deal of time and resources to mount a constitutional challenge. When
unions challenge legislation on the ground that it interferes either with
the freedom to associate or equality rights they are challenging
legislation that has already taken effect. Thus, even when they are
successful, as they were in Dunmore and the B.C. Health Services case,
the Supreme Court’s remedy is typically to suspend the declaration of
invalidity in order to give the government time to come up with a
solution. In Dunmore, the Ontario government adopted a parsimonious
approach to the Supreme Court’s ruling, one that did not even provide
for collective bargaining rights for agricultural workers.122 Moreover, the
subsequent Liberal government, which in its election platform promised
to provide collective bargaining rights to agricultural workers,
vigorously defended against a constitutional challenge to the former
Conservative government’s Agricultural Employees Protection Act.123
After the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the B.C. Health
Services case the parties were able to agree upon a substantial settlement
to the case, $85 million, the vast majority of which will be distributed to
individual workers.124 However, the unions which brought the successful
challenge still had to go through the laborious and expensive process of
organizing the workers’ whose jobs were contracted out because the
changes to the successor rights provisions in Bill 29 did not infringe s.
2(d) of the Charter. Nor will the successful challenge to Bill 29 prevent
the B.C. government from either continuing to privatize health care
services or from changing collective agreements as long as the
government consults with the unions representing the workers before
doing so.
Constitutional litigation does not take place on a level playing field;
governments that are defending impugned legislation typically have a
122

Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 16.
Fudge, affidavit, supra, note 112.
124
Vaughn Palmer, “Liberals, health unions reach agreement at point of judicial gun”
Vancouver Sun, January 28, 2008, at A3. The government has also enacted legislation to repeal the
offending provisions of Bill 29: see Bill 26 — Health Services Amendment Act, 2008, 4th Sess.,
38th Parl., 3rd Reading, May 29, 2008.
123
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great deal more resources than do the unions that are challenging the
legislation. This gives the government a big advantage, and puts unions
on the defensive.125 Moreover, the huge amount of resources spent on
lawyers and experts that goes into defending and challenging legislation
would be much more usefully spent on developing policies that respond
to the profound changes in the labour market that have occurred over the
past 20 years. Once the parties begin to spend resources on either
challenging or defending a specific piece of legislation they dig into their
positions and lose the ability to think of creative solutions to the conflict
within which they are engaged.
Constitutional litigation tends to promote a winner-take-all approach
that influences how the parties approach both the evidence they adduce
and the arguments that they make. My own very limited experience as an
expert witness in constitutional cases suggests that the parties are now
much more concerned about the record than they were in the past.126
However, the fact that the record is of increasing significance in labour
cases does not necessarily mean that the quality of the evidence has
improved. In many cases, it simply means that the behaviour of the
lawyers involved has changed. An anecdote will illustrate this point.
When I was cross-examined on the affidavits that I prepared for
Dunmore, the cross-examination was very similar to a thesis
examination — courteous, rigorous and directed to the matters at issue.
Eight years later when I was cross-examined for the affidavits that I
prepared for Fraser v. Ontario, the cross-examination was an ordeal of
endurance marked by discourtesy.127
Constitutional litigation is not compatible with the complexity of
historical nuance or sticky policy issues that inevitably involves tradeoffs.128 Lawyers have an incentive to simplify the issues at stake in
Charter cases and they necessarily engage in results-based reasoning
since they are working for clients who give them instructions and who
125
According to Paul Cavalluzzo, unions which bring Charter challenges to legislation must
be prepared to spend half a million dollars to take a case to the Supreme Court of Canada (remarks
made by him at the Constitutional Case 2007, Conference, Toronto, April 18, 2008).
126
See Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at para. 35 (S.C.C.) for the
significance of the record in the determination of the violation of s. 2(d) and B.C. Health Services,
supra, note 110, at para. 156 regarding the significance of the record for the s. 1 analysis.
127
For example, despite having been accepted as an expert on matters pertaining to
agricultural workers and the labour law relating to them, in Fraser my curriculum vitae was subject
to several hours of extensive and aggressive cross-examination.
128
Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of Labour
History in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151.
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want to win. The parties often over-egg their arguments and positions
since constitutional litigation, not infrequently, is as much about political
symbolism as it is about legal argument. For these reasons, constitutional
litigation tends to reinforce rather than act as an antidote to partisan
politics.
The most profound problem that I see with constitutional litigation
in pursuit of protecting labour rights is that even when it is successful it
typically is defensive. Unions have gone to court to defend the key
features of industrial pluralism — a system of collective bargaining that
originated with the Wagner Act in 1935 and that was adapted to Canada
with the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations129 in 1944. That system
was designed for the post-war economy, and even at its apogee covered
less than half of the working population in Canada. Since the early
1980s, at the very time the Charter was entrenched, this system has
proven to be less effective as the supply and demand sides of the labour
market have changed; the wages of unionized workers have stagnated
and union density has declined.130 While it is heartening for people who
are concerned with the dignity of workers that the Supreme Court has
elevated collective bargaining to a constitutional right, it is unlikely that
defensive battles fought in courts can turn the economic and political
tide that has undermined the basis for transforming these rights into job
security and improved wages for working people. Nor is it likely the
courts will devise models of representation that can revive a flagging
labour market. Courts appear to be helpful only when unions are weak.

V. CONCLUSION
Giving content to fundamental rights is not an easy task. Moreover,
in a democracy it is appropriate that courts exercise humility when using
their mandate to strike down legislation. In the two cases in which the
Supreme Court of Canada has begun to elaborate a more robust
constitutionally protected freedom to associate in the labour context, the
governments whose actions were successfully challenged had introduced
legislation repealing collective bargaining rights without consulting with
the trade unions who represented the affected workers and they had used
129

Order-in-Council P.C. 1003.
Judy Fudge, “Beyond Vulnerable Workers? Towards a New Standard Employment
Relationship” (2005) 12(2) C.L.E.L.J. 145-70; Judy Fudge, “The New Workplace: Surveying the
Landscape”, Pitblado Conference, Winnipeg, November 9 and 10, 2007.
130
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their majorities to pass legislation without a public debate. After the B.C.
Health Services case, at a minimum, governments will have to consider
public sector workers’ rights and to consult with their unions before
introducing draconian legislation that substantially interferes with the
process of collective bargaining. Thus, the Court’s emphasis on the
government’s duty to bargain in good faith fosters democratic deliberation
and imposes an inhibition on an instinctive vilification of public sector
workers’ rights.
Despite its newfound appreciation of workers’ rights, the Supreme
Court of Canada has endorsed only a thin, procedural understanding of
collective bargaining that tends to reify the existing industrial pluralist
model of labour legislation. Nor has it grappled with the hard question of
when the state has an obligation to protect workers from the exercise of
private power — a power that is shaped and reinforced by deeply
embedded common law rules.131 Although the Court invoked substantive
equality as one of the Charter values that supported providing
constitutional protection for the right to bargain collectively, it did not
develop the link between equality and the freedom to associate.132 In fact,
the Court’s dismissive treatment of the health care workers’ equality
claim suggests that substantive equality has little judicial purchase in the
world of work.

131
In Dunmore, supra, note 126, the Court narrowly circumscribed the positive obligation
on the state to provide legislative protection for labour rights and in B.C. Health Services, supra,
note 110, the Court did not question this limited obligation.
132
According to Sheldon Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labor Law and
Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), at 270-71, equality is the normative
grounding for the freedom to associate: “freedom to associate does not simply fit into the scheme of
equal liberty, whereby one aims to find an appropriate equilibrium between rival claims to space for
free action. Instead, there is built into the very specification of that space, describing the type of
liberty which the right is aiming to protect, a demand for equality.”

